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The effect of increasing school resources on educational 
outcomes is a central issue in the debate on improving 
school quality. This paper uses a randomized experiment to 
analyze the impact of a school grants program in Senegal, 
which allowed schools to apply for funding for improve-
ments of their own choice. The analysis finds positive 
effects on test scores at lower grades that persist at least 
two years. These effects are concentrated among schools 
that focused funds on human resource improvements 
rather than school materials, suggesting that teachers and 
principals may be a central determinant of school quality.
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1 Introduction
In the last 50 years, primary school enrollment has increased dramatically in the developing
world. Even in the poorest areas of Sub-Saharan Africa, gross enrollment rates in primary school
are approaching 80 percent (e.g., Glewwe and Kremer (2006)). There is, however, widespread
evidence that the quality of education in developing countries remains very low. As a result,
increases in school enrollment may not translate into corresponding increases in productivity and
wellbeing. This is consistent with recent evidence suggesting that education quality, not quantity,
matters most for growth (e.g., Hanushek and Woessmann (2010), Glewwe et al. (2013)).
We address the following question: is it possible to improve the quality of poor schools by
providing them with cash transfers? The appeal of this idea lies in its simplicity. The assumption
behind it is that local decision makers, such as principals and community leaders, are likely to
have a deeper understanding of the needs of their schools than central education authorities, and
are therefore in the best position to put these resources to their most eﬃcient use.
We study a school grant program in Senegal, which was developed to decentralize at least a
small part of the country's education budget. Through this program, every elementary school in
Senegal could apply for funds for a speciﬁc school project that seeks to improve the quality of
learning and teaching, with the best proposals being selected through a competitive process. The
maximum amount a school could receive for a project amounted to USD$3,190, which corresponded
to 7 percent of the total annual school budget of a typical school (inclusive of teacher salaries).
We ﬁnd large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on test scores one year after the start of the
intervention, for children who beneﬁted from school grants when they were in second grade -
especially for girls. The eﬀects are larger for schools in the South of the country, where projects
tended to focus on training human resources (teaching and management), compared to the North,
where priority was placed on the acquisition of school material (e.g., textbooks/manuals). We do
not observe similar program impacts for children in other grades. The point estimates are very
similar in the second follow up for the same children, pointing to persistent eﬀects.
Since we examine the impact of the intervention across diﬀerent tests and diﬀerent groups of
students, for inferential purposes we implement a step-down procedure proposed by Romano and
Wolf (2005) that controls the probability of falsely rejecting at least one true null hypothesis,
and improves upon more conservative prior methods for multiple hypothesis testing such as the
2
Bonferroni procedure. We show that our main conclusions survive and are unlikely to be due to
false rejections.
The evidence on the eﬀect of school resources on primary school student achievement in de-
veloping countries is at best mixed (see Glewwe and Kremer (2006), Glewwe et al. (2013), and
Murnane and Ganimian (2014) for reviews). While some pedagogical resources, such as textbooks
and ﬂipcharts, only have positive eﬀects for high-achieving students (see Glewwe et al. (2009),
Glewwe et al. (2004)), other resources such as computer-assisted instruction increased test scores
by up to one-half of a standard deviation in India (Banerjee et al. (2007)). If local decision-makers
can target resources better than a central authority, however, school grants (and other ways of
decentralizing funding) could help boost the eﬀect of school resources by targeting funds toward
eﬃcient uses of resources (see Galiani and Perez-Truglia (2013) for a review).
The approach used in Senegal is one of decentralization of school resources, in the sense that it
is the schools themselves that deﬁne their needs. Recent work on secondary schools in Argentina
and primary schools in the Gambia ﬁnd positive eﬀects of decentralization (Galiani et al. (2008),
Blimpo et al. (2014)). Meanwhile, cross-country comparisons show negative eﬀects of decentral-
ization for developing countries (Hanushek et al. (2013)). We cannot conclude whether the grants
approach is superior to an alternative where resources are directed centrally, because no other
approach was tried. However, our results indicate that decentralized distribution of resources
through school grants can have positive eﬀects on student achievement, and we present suggestive
evidence that factors such as teacher quality may have enhanced the impacts.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the school grants program in Senegal
and the evaluation design. In Section 3 we describe our data and Section 4 describes our empirical
approach. In Section 5 we present our main results and examine potential mediating factors
through which the impact of the program may have operated. Section 6 concludes.
2 Description of the Program and Evaluation
Primary schooling in Senegal consists of six years of education and is funded through a mix of
government, foreign aid, and household resources.1 Almost all classroom instruction is conducted
1Fees collected from parents represent around ten percent of school funding in 2006 (PASEC (2007)) and are a
non-trivial ﬁnancial burden on families: around one-ﬁfth of students who dropped out in the ﬁrst year of primary
school did so because of limited ﬁnancial resources of their parents (World Bank (2013)).
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in French, while the language spoken by students at home is predominantly not French (only 11
percent of the household interviews were conducted in French). Gross enrollment rates in primary
schools increased dramatically over the ten years prior to our study, from 67 percent in 2000 to
92 percent in 2009. Despite this large increase in enrollment, in 2009 only 60 percent of students
completed primary school. In an eﬀort to increase the quality of primary education, Senegal's
Ministry of Education initiated this school grants program.
2.1 School Grants in Senegal
For the past several years, Senegal has used school grants (projets d'école) as a tool to fund
improvements in education quality, based on the premise that school-level actors are in the best
position to identify a school's unique deﬁciencies and the most workable solutions to address
them. Beginning in 2009, the emphasis of these grants shifted from strengthening the physical
environment toward pedagogic issues. At that point the government also sought technical and
ﬁnancial support from the World Bank to rigorously evaluate the program.
The main goal of the program was to improve school quality, as measured by student learning
outcomes, speciﬁcally by improving pedagogical resources in the school. Instead of providing
general funding for all schools, funds were targeted towards problems identiﬁed by the school
as major obstacles to quality, and identiﬁed by a government evaluation committee (Inspection
Départementale de l'Education Nationale, IDEN) as being eligible for funding based on district-
level and system-wide priorities. Problems were identiﬁed at the local level, in the hope that
decentralized decision-making would allow more eﬃcient and eﬀective use of funds.
Generally, the program worked as follows. The Ministry of Education issued a call for pro-
posals, based on the available grant funding, priority areas, and eligible activities (and sometimes
eligible regions). Schools that decided to apply for funding completed a grant application for a
school project (called the projet d'école) addressing a particular pedagogical issue faced by the
school. Another important component of the program was its role in promoting strong community
participation in schools. As a result, grants were prepared by a committee of parents, teachers, and
local oﬃcials. For schools that received a grant, the grant totaled around 1,500,000 CFA Francs
(approximately USD$3,190), which represented a roughly 7 percent increase in expenditures per
student in a typical school (inclusive of teacher salaries, which comprise over 90 percent of the
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budget).2 We next describe the process through which grants were approved and allocated.
2.2 Evaluation Design
In the initial stage of this study, all Senegalese schools were eligible to respond to the call for
proposals. The IDEN evaluation committee ﬁrst ranked the applications and discarded low quality
and ineligible applications. The remaining ones, referred to as approved applications were
grouped into two categories. The ﬁrst consisted of very good proposals which were eligible for
ﬁnancing. The second consisted of strong proposals with potential, but which needed revision.
These were sent back to schools with comments from the IDEN evaluation committee, then re-
submitted. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of this process.
Figure 1: Evaluation Design
To implement this process, the procedures manual for the projets d'école was amended (relative
to versions used for earlier cohorts of school grants) to include the revision of strong proposals
needing adjustments. An additional oﬃcial document issued by the Ministry of Education was
circulated throughout the IDENs in the country, establishing the procedure described above as
the norm for the allocation of funds for the next cohort of school projects.
2These numbers are based on collected self-reports from principals and teachers in our sample.
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Figure 2: Evaluation Timeline
This process resulted in the selection of 633 projects to fund, whose locations are shown in
Figure 4 in Appendix B.3 For the purposes of the evaluation, these 633 projects were randomly
allocated to three funding cohorts. 211 schools were selected randomly to receive funding in the
ﬁrst cohort (June 2009), at the end of the school year. This funding could only be executed at
the beginning of the following school year (October/November). Of the remaining schools, 211
were to receive funding in June 2010, and another 211 were to receive funding in June 2011. In
practice, the disbursement of the second round of grants did not occur until the ﬁrst trimester of
2011. This means that between mid-2009 and mid-2011, two groups of schools can be compared.
The schools in the ﬁrst cohort received school grants during this period, while the schools in the
second and third cohorts did not and therefore can be used as a comparison group for the schools
in the ﬁrst cohort. The school year runs from October/November through June, allowing us to
compare the ﬁrst cohort to both the second and third cohorts for the 2009-2010 school year and
the ﬁrst cohort to the third cohort for the 2010-2011 school year (see Figure 2).
3Of these projects, 96 percent included a component to improve French outcomes, 70 percent had a component
to improve math outcomes, and 52 percent had a component to improve science outcomes. 82 percent of the
projects aimed to build capacity, 63 percent aimed to increase teaching time, and 45 percent aimed to reduce
repetition and drop-out. The intended beneﬁciaries of these projects, in addition to students, were the teachers
and principal in 84 percent of projects, and the management committee in 29 percent of projects.
6
The randomization among eligible schools is critical for our study: it ensures that the three
successive cohorts are statistically comparable, which in turn ensures unbiased estimates of the
eﬀect of the program. In this process it is crucial that the control group contains only schools
that were judged as eligible but were not selected to receive funding by the randomization process
until a later date.
3 Data and Balance
In order to gather data for this study, three waves of surveys were administered to students and
their families, teachers, and principals in these schools. A baseline survey was conducted at the
start of the 2009-2010 academic year (in November), right as the ﬁrst round of grants were able
to be executed. Subsequent surveys took place in November 2010 at the beginning of the 2010-
2011 academic year (ﬁrst follow-up), and in May 2011 at the end of the 2010-2011 academic year
(second follow-up).
At baseline, we administered written assessments in mathematics and French to a random
sample of 6 children in each of grades 2 and 4, and an oral reading assessment (similar to Early
Grade Reading Assessment, or EGRA) to a random sample of 3 of those 6 children in grades 2
and 4. Importantly, the same tests were administered across all waves. In addition, we randomly
selected 2 of the 3 children in each grade who took all three assessments, and conducted a household
survey that included demographic and ﬁnancial information on all household members. Finally,
we collected classroom and school level information by surveying the school principals and the
teachers of the students in our sample.
In the ﬁrst follow-up, we surveyed and tested the same children again (at the start of 3rd
and 5th grade, respectively) and their households, teachers and principals. Schools who received
grants in the ﬁrst cohort answered a set of questions on the use of the extra funds. To examine the
possibility that funds were disproportionately channelled to students preparing to enter secondary
school, we also administered written assessments in mathematics and French to a random sample
of children who were in 6th grade at follow-up, and also surveyed their teachers.
In the second follow-up, we re-surveyed and tested the same children who were tested at
baseline and ﬁrst follow-up. In addition, in the second follow-up we administered the Peabody
Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) to children and their mothers. We did not collect general school
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and classroom information in the second follow-up.4
Of the 633 schools, split randomly into three cohorts of 211 schools each, we sampled 525.
We were able to contact 478 schools at baseline (among which 447 were successfully surveyed),
528 at ﬁrst follow-up5 (among which 517 were successfully surveyed), and 340 at second follow-up
(among which 325 were successfully surveyed and tested).6 The schools that were not included
at baseline were out of bounds either due to inclement weather or rebel activity in the South.
While this may have impacted the representativeness of the baseline sample, it did not aﬀect the
balance as accessibility was not correlated with treatment status, as we will report later. Due to
budgetary constraints, in the second follow-up we dropped Cohort 2 schools, and ended up with a
sample of 352 schools, of which 325 schools were successfully surveyed and tested. Since cohorts
were randomly allocated, this did not introduce bias.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and balance between treatment and control schools for
grades 2 and 4. Columns 2 and 4 show means and standard deviations of baseline characteristics
in control schools, and columns 3 and 5 report the diﬀerences in characteristics between treatment
and control at baseline and their standard errors. Panel A reports test scores.7 The resulting mean
scores for the French, mathematics, and oral tests (calculated as the proportion of correct responses
on the exam) were around 20-40 percent. The same tests were administered at ﬁrst follow-up, so
these scores allowed room for noticeable improvement. The fourth row corresponds to an index of
the three tests (which is the ﬁrst principal component of these three tests, standardized to have
unit variance).
Panel B shows household characteristics of the students. On average these students live less
than a kilometer from the school and miss one day of school per month. Their households spend
a fair amount of their income on education expenses as compared to household food consumption,
and over half of the parents claim to be involved in school activities. Only 10 percent of the
4During the 2nd follow up we also tested a random sample of 2nd, 4th, and 6th grade students in French and
mathematics, but did not collect any household information on them. However, in this study we concentrate on
the panel of children we originally selected at baseline as planned in the randomization protocol. This ensures our
results are not in any way aﬀected by composition eﬀects due to mobility of children that could have been induced
as a result of the program.
5We contacted more schools in the ﬁrst follow-up than we originally sampled because the enumerators acciden-
tally went to an extra treatment and two extra control schools that we had not originally planned on sampling.
6See Appendix Table 14 for the corresponding number of student-level observations and attrition. In Appendix
Table 15 we show the diﬀerence in baseline characteristics between treatment and control schools, for students
who did not leave the sample between baseline and ﬁrst follow-up or second follow-up, respectively. The sample is
similarly balanced as our main sample (see below).
7The full distribution of test scores is in Appendix A.
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household interviews were conducted in French.
Panel C reports school characteristics. The average school in our sample is not small: it has 347
students and 10 teachers, half of whom hold a baccalaureate degree and half of whom participated
in training in the ﬁve years preceding the intervention. The schools are varied in their resources:
56 percent have electricity, and 23 percent have a library. Three-quarters of principals have a
baccalaureate degree.
Treatment and control schools are very well balanced. All but two diﬀerences (parental in-
volvement in school and the percent of teachers who report receiving training in the past ﬁve
years, both for second grade) are insigniﬁcant at the 5% level. It is noteworthy that the precision
of the diﬀerence in test scores is very high, which bodes very well for our ability to detect even
small eﬀects of the program.8
As explained above, some schools were inaccessible at baseline, and thus were only added to the
survey in the ﬁrst follow up (although they participated in the randomization, and the treatment
schools in this group were funded as planned). The exclusion from baseline was unrelated to
treatment status, which explains why nevertheless baseline schools are balanced. In Appendix
Table 6 we present descriptive statistics for all schools including those added at the ﬁrst follow
up. As we expect, when we compare the characteristics of treatment and control schools which
we did not expect to change as a result of the experiment there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence, other
than possibly in distance from school. However this is just one signiﬁcant diﬀerence among many
diﬀerences; jointly there are no diﬀerences and this one is very small in magnitude. Hence, whether
we look at schools surveyed at baseline or at the ﬁrst followup, there is no evidence of imbalances
between treatment and control with respect to their time-invariant characteristics.
Another concern is that these 633 schools may be fundamentally diﬀerent from other primary
schools in Senegal as a result of the grant selection process (e.g., these schools were better organized
to put together a good grant application). Thus, they may not constitute a random set of schools
in Senegal and the results of this study may not generalize. In Appendix Table 7, we show
characteristics of a nationally representative sample of Senegalese households using data collected
8With the exception of the index score, we chose not to standardize the mathematics, French, and oral scores.
The tests were designed to appropriately measure the types of skills taught in the ﬁrst years of elementary school,
and looking at the proportion of right answers in this test is a natural way to assess student knowledge in these
subjects, and its progress over time. Furthermore, these scores are speciﬁc to Senegal, so standardization would not
be useful for international comparisons. Even within sample, we show in Appendix B that the distribution of scores
is highly non-normal, so a one standard deviation in test scores does not have the usual meaning. Nevertheless, for
our main results we report standard deviations of control schools to convert results to standard deviations.
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Table 1: Baseline Descriptive Statistics and Balance, by Grade
Grade 2 Grade 4
Control Treat-Control Control Treat-Control
Panel A: Test Scores
Percent Correct: French 0.42 (0.22) -0.01 (0.02) 0.39 (0.17) 0.00 (0.01)
Percent Correct: Math 0.37 (0.23) -0.00 (0.02) 0.33 (0.19) -0.01 (0.02)
Percent Correct: Oral 0.22 (0.17) 0.01 (0.02) 0.55 (0.24) -0.01 (0.02)
Index Score (standardized) 0.00 (0.98) -0.00 (0.09) 0.02 (0.98) -0.05 (0.09)
Panel B: Household Characteristics
Days of school missed last week 0.17 (0.86) 0.07 (0.07) 0.16 (0.75) -0.07∗ (0.04)
Student works after school 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.14) -0.01∗ (0.01)
Household size 9.26 (4.06) 0.00 (0.32) 9.07 (4.05) 0.14 (0.33)
Number of children in household 5.25 (2.61) -0.03 (0.20) 5.14 (2.77) 0.21 (0.22)
Head has any education 0.60 (0.49) -0.02 (0.04) 0.56 (0.50) -0.06 (0.04)
Percent of adult females with any education 0.37 (0.41) -0.03 (0.03) 0.31 (0.39) -0.01 (0.03)
Distance to school (km) 0.71 (0.91) -0.07 (0.06) 0.76 (2.56) -0.03 (0.12)
Parent involved in school 0.38 (0.49) 0.09∗∗ (0.04) 0.45 (0.50) -0.07∗ (0.04)
Expenditure on household food (1,000s CFA) 21.83 (15.45) 1.26 (1.17) 22.11 (15.50) 0.51 (1.20)
Expenditure on uniform (1,000s CFA) 2.43 (1.19) 0.15 (0.36) 2.28 (1.13) 0.06 (0.35)
Expenditure on tuition (1,000s CFA) 1.10 (1.18) -0.01 (0.09) 1.03 (1.01) 0.04 (0.09)
Expenditure on supplies (1,000s CFA) 3.85 (5.64) -0.38 (0.29) 4.34 (4.16) -0.38 (0.27)
Student has tutor 0.15 (0.36) -0.01 (0.03) 0.14 (0.35) -0.01 (0.03)
Home has electricity 0.47 (0.50) 0.03 (0.04) 0.45 (0.50) 0.02 (0.04)
Home has modern toilet 0.54 (0.50) -0.01 (0.04) 0.50 (0.50) 0.01 (0.04)
Land owned (hectares) 2.37 (3.47) 0.43 (0.46) 2.89 (9.11) -0.50 (0.43)
Interview conducted in French 0.12 (0.32) -0.04∗ (0.02) 0.11 (0.31) -0.01 (0.02)
Panel C: School and Teacher Characteristics
Distance to nearest city (km) 18.38 (25.01) -0.07 (2.18) 18.03 (24.56) 0.21 (2.20)
Locality population (100,000s) 1.38 (4.40) 0.04 (0.46) 1.41 (4.43) 0.03 (0.45)
Locality has health center 0.71 (0.45) 0.03 (0.04) 0.71 (0.45) 0.03 (0.04)
School located in South 0.18 (0.39) -0.01 (0.04) 0.19 (0.39) -0.01 (0.04)
School has Electricity 0.57 (0.50) 0.01 (0.05) 0.57 (0.50) 0.01 (0.05)
Number of Teachers 9.68 (4.97) 0.44 (0.51) 9.74 (4.93) 0.57 (0.52)
Number of Pupils 341.11 (252.39) 28.47 (25.60) 343.65 (253.37) 35.57 (26.05)
School has library 0.21 (0.40) 0.08∗ (0.04) 0.21 (0.41) 0.08∗ (0.04)
Number of computers 1.28 (4.39) -0.01 (0.40) 1.30 (4.39) 0.01 (0.40)
Number of manuals in classroom 59.90 (45.18) 3.17 (4.58) 66.43 (51.96) 5.68 (5.40)
Percent teachers female 0.32 (0.24) 0.01 (0.02) 0.32 (0.23) 0.01 (0.02)
Average teacher age 33.12 (4.24) -0.13 (0.39) 33.26 (4.23) -0.10 (0.39)
Percent of teachers with Baccalaureate 0.41 (0.23) -0.02 (0.02) 0.41 (0.22) -0.02 (0.02)
Average teacher experience 6.56 (3.69) 0.08 (0.35) 6.61 (3.69) 0.13 (0.35)
Percent teachers with training in past 5 years 0.47 (0.50) 0.10∗∗ (0.05) 0.47 (0.50) 0.01 (0.05)
Percent of principals with Baccalaureate 0.74 (0.44) -0.05 (0.04) 0.74 (0.44) -0.06 (0.04)
Notes: Grouped columns 2 and 4 report means and standard deviations of baseline characteristics in control schools
for grades 2 and 4, respectively. Grouped columns 3 and 5 report diﬀerences in characteristis between treatment and
control schools at baseline and their standard errors, clustered by school. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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in 2006 by PASEC,9 a survey aimed at assessing educational attainment in primary school, and
variables that correspond to those in our data. Schools in our sample have fewer students and
are more likely to have electricity than the average school in Senegal, but are similar on other
measures, including the literacy rates, the number of teachers and their education, and whether
the school has a library. At least in terms of these variables, our sample does not look drastically
diﬀerent from the average Senegalese primary school.
4 Empirical Approach and Inference
We use a regression approach to estimate the impacts of the program. Speciﬁcally, the impacts
are the estimated βkt coeﬃcients from the following regression:
Y kist = α
k
t + β
k
tGs +Xisλt + ε
k
ist (1)
where Y kist is the proportion of correct answers in test k, for student i in school s at follow up t (1 or
2), Gs is a treatment indicator, Xis are conditioning variables measured at baseline, and ε
k
ist is an
error term. Conditioning variables include household size, number of children, whether the head
has any education, distance to school, a wealth index10, the interview language, and the baseline
scores of all tests. Since household interviews were conducted for only a random subsample of
students, two-thirds of our sample has missing household characteristics (at random). In order to
keep these observations, we assign zeros to conditioning variables if they are missing and include
dummies for observations with missing conditioning variables.11
We report standard errors, clustered at the school level, and symbols ***, **, and * to denote
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of standard single hypothesis tests, respectively. In
addition, since we are testing multiple hypotheses at once we compute levels of signiﬁcance for each
9Programme for the Analysis of Education Systems of the (Conférence des Ministres de l'Education des Etats
et gouvernements de la Francophonie).
10The wealth index is standardized to have unit variance and is deﬁned as the ﬁrst principal component of
the following variables: the home has electricity, the home has plumbing, the home has a radio, the home has a
television, the home has a telephone, the home has a computer, the home has a refrigerator, the home has gas,
the home has an iron, the home has a bicycle, the home has an automobile, the home has a bed, the home has
a modern toilet, the number of chickens, the number of sheep, the number of cows, the number of horses, the
number of donkeys, the amount of land, savings, debt, food expenditure, child expenditure, other expenditure, wall
material, ground material, and roof material.
11Results without conditioning variables are presented in Appendix Table 8 and they are almost identical, but
of course less precise.
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coeﬃcient using the step-down approach of Romano and Wolf (2005). In this way we control for
the family-wise error rate (FWE). The FWE is deﬁned as the probability of incorrectly identifying
at least one coeﬃcient as signiﬁcant, which becomes more likely as the number of hypothesis
tests increases. The Romano-Wolf approach improves upon more conservative classical methods
such as the Bonferroni correction by applying a step-down" algorithm that takes advantage of
the dependence structure of individual tests. Our approach is to control for a FWE of 5 and 10
percent and mark each coeﬃcient that is signiﬁcant at each of these rates with †† and † respectively.
However, testing too many hypotheses at once may reduce power to detect anything signiﬁcant.
We thus test multiple hypotheses in related groups rather than for all eﬀects reported in the paper.
5 Results
5.1 Overall Treatment Eﬀects
We begin by showing the overall eﬀect of the program for grades 2 and 4 at baseline (they were
in grade 3 and 5 at follow-up). As explained above, at ﬁrst follow-up we have measurements
of student performance in written tests in French and mathematics, as well as an oral test that
covers sound, letter and word recognition, and reading comprehension, but (for cost reasons) was
only administered to a third of the students who take written tests. For each of these three
tests we compute the proportion of correct answers given by each student. In addition, we use
the ﬁrst principal component as a summary index of these three tests, which is standardized to
have mean zero and standard deviation 1. For the second follow-up, we also have scores for the
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, which is standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation
1 (within grade).
The results are in Table 2. Panel A concerns the ﬁrst follow up, which was administered at the
start of grades 3 and 5 respectively about a year after the disbursement of the project funds, while
Panel B relates to the the second follow up at the end of grade 3 and 5 for the same children, which
we are following throughout. The ﬁrst three columns report eﬀects on French, mathematics, and
oral test scores. The fourth column provides a summary measure by reporting the ﬁrst principal
component of these three tests.12 Column 5 reports PPVT scores, which were obtained only in
12One interpretation of the individual tests is that they are noisy measurements of one underlying human capital
factor. By using the ﬁrst principal component of the three tests, we may improve precision.
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Table 2: Program Impacts on Grades 3 and 5 Test Scores
French Math Oral Index PPVT
Panel A: Beginning of Grade (First Follow-Up)
Overall 0.021∗∗† 0.019∗∗† 0.019∗† 0.080∗†
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.044)
Observations 5368 5361 2732 2679
Control Mean (SD) 0.51 (0.23) 0.49 (0.23) 0.50 (0.27)
Grade 3 0.029∗∗† 0.027∗∗† 0.029∗∗† 0.126∗∗†
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.060)
Observations 2720 2718 1385 1350
Control Mean (SD) 0.53 (0.25) 0.54 (0.24) 0.35 (0.22)
Grade 5 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.027
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.053)
Observations 2648 2643 1347 1329
Control Mean (SD) 0.48 (0.20) 0.44 (0.20) 0.64 (0.24)
Panel B: End of Grade (Second Follow-Up)
Overall 0.020∗ 0.005 0.026∗∗† 0.094∗† 0.057
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.054) (0.082)
Observations 3338 3327 1686 1620 1122
Control Mean (SD) 0.63 (0.22) 0.62 (0.22) 0.58 (0.26)
Grade 3 0.035∗∗† 0.017 0.039∗∗† 0.160∗∗† 0.153
(0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.077) (0.096)
Observations 1732 1721 853 826 566
Control Mean (SD) 0.66 (0.23) 0.68 (0.23) 0.45 (0.23)
Grade 5 0.003 -0.008 0.007 0.013 -0.060
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.061) (0.097)
Observations 1606 1606 833 794 556
Control Mean (SD) 0.59 (0.20) 0.57 (0.20) 0.72 (0.21)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 correspond to p-values from the usual single-hypothesis tests. †
corresponds signiﬁcance at the 10% level of Romano Wolf (2005) p-values from joint tests
of French, mathematics, and oral (3 tests each, by row) or to the index alone. Conditioning
variables: Grade, gender, household size, number of children, education of head, distance to
school, wealth index, interview language, baseline scores, missing dummies.
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the second follow-up.
In the pooled sample, the index shows an improvement equal to 8.0% of a standard deviation
in the ﬁrst follow up, which is signiﬁcant at the 5.2% level. This improvement is maintained and
increased to 9.4% of a standard deviation in the second follow up, which has a p-value of 7.2%.
Thus overall the program improved outcomes in the schools. When we break down the index to
the individual tests we administered and adjust the p-values for multiple testing we ﬁnd that all
test scores improved in the ﬁrst follow up by similar amounts and their adjusted p-values are less
than 10%. In the second follow up the improvement in math was lost but the one in French and
the oral remained and are both signiﬁcant at least at the 10% level.
The improvement in overall test scores is largely driven by eﬀects in third but not ﬁfth grade.
There are large impacts of school grants on third grade test scores across all tests. Test scores
increased by almost 3 percentage points, which is a large eﬀect in light of the means (and standard
deviations) of test scores. When we look at this aggregate index of the three tests, the school grant
increases third grade school performance by 0.126 of a standard deviation at the ﬁrst follow-up.
The eﬀect on the index survives at 0.16 of a standard deviation through the end of grade three,
indicating that the program impacts persisted two years after the grant was disbursed to schools.
It is interesting that a relatively small grant is able to improve children's learning outcomes
to this extent. By contrast, in Glewwe and Kremer's (2006) survey of the recent literature on the
eﬀectiveness of improvements in school resources on students' learning in developing countries,
there are several interventions that show no signiﬁcant impact. In developed countries, there are
even fewer examples of successful school resource interventions (Hanushek (2006)).
It is possible that the intervention improved outcomes because it provided cash in a decentral-
ized way to local decision makers, who could then put these funds to an eﬃcient use. Nevertheless,
there is abundant evidence of leakages in other similar grant programs across the world (Reinikka
and Svensson (2004), Bruns et al. (2011)). If the extent of local capture of these funds is also
substantial in Senegal then the results in this paper are even more remarkable because they would
have been produced with minimal resources.
However, these eﬀects are absent for ﬁfth graders: the impacts are numerically close to zero
and statistically insigniﬁcant by any criterion. The standard errors of the estimates are similar
across grades, but the point estimates are much smaller.13 This is perhaps surprising. However,
13Therefore, the lack of statistically signiﬁcant results in grade 5 (but not in grade 3) does not appear to be due
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principals may be investing more in earlier grades driven by a belief that learning delays emerge
early in the life of the child. Indeed such a belief is actively promoted by PASEC.
Using data from the teachers' questionnaires at follow-up we investigate whether there were
diﬀerential impacts of school grants on observable investments in 3rd and 5th grade students in
Panel A of Appendix Table 9.14 Some of the variables we can study are classroom materials (e.g.,
textbooks/manuals, desks, tables, etc), and teacher training. We ﬁnd no diﬀerential impact of the
program in any of these. When we examine other classroom characteristics or teacher behaviors,
the only interesting diﬀerence to report concerns student (mis-)behavior in the classroom. While
in third grade there was a positive impact of the program on student behavior as measured by
the number of times a day a teacher needs to demand silence, in ﬁfth grade there was a negative
impact of the program on student behavior measured by this variable, and by the number of times
a teacher has to punish a child for impolite behavior.
Observable parental investments are not diﬀerent between grades three and ﬁve (see Panel B
of Appendix Table 9), which is prima facie evidence that the diﬀerences are attributable to the
eﬀectiveness or administration of grants between the grades.
5.2 Distributional Impacts
Whether the program has diﬀerent eﬀects across the distribution is an important question relating
to targeting. In Figure 3 we show parameter estimates together with their 95% conﬁdence intervals
from a quantile regression of the relevant test scores for grade three in the ﬁrst follow-up (ﬁrst
column) and second follow-up (second column), on the treatment indicator and including the
usual controls, clustered by school. The eﬀects of the grant are generally spread over most of
the distribution as shown by the index in the fourth row, although the results are less precise
due to smaller sample sizes, particularly in the second follow-up. In the second follow-up, for
mathematics the eﬀects are larger at the lower end of the distribution, while for French, oral, and
PPVT scores the eﬀects are somewhat larger in the mid- to the upper end of the distribution.
In the remaining part of the paper we look in greater detail at these results and consider
to a lack of power. If the point estimates for grade 5 were as large as those for grade 3 it is likely that we would
be able to reject that they were statistically equal to zero. When designing our study we anticipated that with our
sample we would be able to detect program impacts of between 0.2 and 0.3 standard deviations, which is in line
with what we ﬁnd.
14Ideally we would want to do this using 2nd and, say, 4th grade students, but we do not have the follow-up data
for these teachers, although we have baseline data for them.
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Figure 3: Distributional Impacts on Test Scores in Third Grade
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heterogeneity of eﬀects and underlying mechanisms.
5.3 Heterogenous Impacts
In this section we consider characteristics by which the impact of the school grants may plausibly
diﬀer: gender, prior ability, and region (the South is much poorer and geographically distinct
from the North). For baseline ability, we convert corresponding baseline test scores into a "high"
(above median) or "low" (below median) binary variable.15 For region, we distinguish schools
located in the most southern regions in Senegal (Ziguinchor and Kolda) from schools in the rest of
the country. We consider these regions separately because Ziguinchor and Kolda are much poorer
regions (ANSD (2007)) and have been beset by problems related to rebel activity.
The regressions we run to construct Table 3 extend equation (1) to include an interaction
between the treatment variable Gs and a pre-determined variable Wist (gender, baseline ability,
or region):
Y kist = α
k
t + β
k
tGs + δ
k
t (Gs ∗Wist) + ψktWist + εkist (2)
Since our larger estimates of program impacts were for students in 3rd grade, who were ﬁrst
exposed to the program in 2nd grade, we focus this analysis of heterogeneous impacts on them.16
The results are shown in Table 3. Panel A reports results from the ﬁrst follow-up, and Panel B
reports results from the second follow-up. Each panel reports program impacts for each Wist as
well as control means and standard deviations.
There are large diﬀerences in program impact by gender. For females, the program increased
test scores by 3 to 5 percentage points in the ﬁrst follow-up, and increased even more in the second
follow-up, with the exception of mathematics. This indicates that program impacts persisted two
years after the grant was disbursed to schools for girls. The eﬀects we report for girls are all
individually signiﬁcant, except for the PPVT and mathematics in the second follow up. However,
we note that, based on the step-down p-values, the eﬀects are not signiﬁcant in the second followup
(albeit the sample used is smaller, since we could not use cohort 2 schools). While the individual
tests score diﬀerences between genders are not signiﬁcant, the diﬀerence in the overall index is
15As mentioned, several schools were missing at baseline. In Appendix Table 10 we show that missing schools
at baseline are mainly in the South, and that they display worse student performance in the ﬁrst follow-up than
comparable non-missing schools. It is noteworthy that they are not disproportionately control or treatment schools.
16A similar analysis performed on the test results of students in 5th grade did not produce evidence of any
program impacts for this set of students (see Appendix Table 11).
17
Table 3: Program Impacts on Grades 3 Test Scores by Gender, Ability, and Region
French Math Oral Index PPVT
Panel A: Beginning of Grade (First Follow-Up)
Male 0.022 0.024 0.011 0.041
(0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.073)
Female 0.037∗∗† 0.031∗∗† 0.047∗∗∗† 0.217∗∗∗†
(0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.073)
Male Control Mean (SD) 0.54 (0.25) 0.56 (0.24) 0.37 (0.22) 0.03 (0.97)
Female Control Mean (SD) 0.53 (0.24) 0.53 (0.24) 0.33 (0.22) -0.13 (0.99)
Low Ability 0.006 -0.007 0.025 -0.019
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.081)
High Ability 0.027 0.029∗ 0.005 0.136∗†
(0.020) (0.016) (0.019) (0.075)
Low Control Mean (SD) 0.47 (0.22) 0.43 (0.20) 0.25 (0.17) -0.46 (0.83)
High Control Mean (SD) 0.62 (0.24) 0.68 (0.20) 0.48 (0.20) 0.49 (0.85)
North 0.012 0.015 0.019 0.066
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.067)
South 0.102∗∗∗† 0.079∗∗∗† 0.074∗∗∗† 0.390∗∗∗†
(0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.123)
North Control Mean (SD) 0.56 (0.24) 0.57 (0.23) 0.38 (0.22) 0.10 (0.95)
South Control Mean (SD) 0.41 (0.23) 0.43 (0.22) 0.23 (0.19) -0.63 (0.88)
Panel B: End of Grade (Second Follow-Up)
Male 0.026 0.016 0.024 0.079 0.207∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.022) (0.087) (0.115)
Female 0.043∗∗† 0.019 0.054∗∗† 0.245∗∗† 0.096
(0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.102) (0.128)
Male Control Mean (SD) 0.67 (0.23) 0.69 (0.22) 0.46 (0.22) -0.01 (0.92) -0.07 (0.95)
Female Control Mean (SD) 0.65 (0.24) 0.67 (0.23) 0.43 (0.23) -0.17 (1.03) -0.10 (1.01)
Low Ability 0.027 0.001 0.036 0.081
(0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.116)
High Ability 0.029 0.027 0.028 0.174∗†
(0.022) (0.019) (0.024) (0.096)
Low Control Mean (SD) 0.60 (0.23) 0.60 (0.22) 0.34 (0.20) -0.45 (0.93)
High Control Mean (SD) 0.75 (0.20) 0.78 (0.19) 0.56 (0.20) 0.39 (0.82)
North 0.024 0.000 0.023 0.087 0.130
(0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.084) (0.097)
South 0.079∗∗† 0.084∗∗† 0.105∗∗∗† 0.450∗∗∗† 0.181
(0.037) (0.033) (0.035) (0.161) (0.250)
North Control Mean (SD) 0.69 (0.23) 0.71 (0.22) 0.48 (0.22) 0.07 (0.92) -0.21 (0.88)
South Control Mean (SD) 0.58 (0.24) 0.57 (0.23) 0.31 (0.21) -0.67 (0.96) 0.43 (1.13)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01 correspond to p-values from the usual single-hypothesis tests. † corresponds signiﬁcance at the
10% level of Romano Wolf (2005) p-values from joint tests of French, mathematics, and oral (3 tests
each, by row) or to the index alone. Conditioning variables: Grade, gender, household size, number
of children, education of head, distance to school, wealth index, interview language, baseline scores,
missing dummies.
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signiﬁcant at least at the 10% level.
There are also several education interventions that beneﬁt mostly girls. It is much less common
to ﬁnd programs that aﬀect boys alone. Some examples of (early childhood) interventions in devel-
oped countries that produce larger cognitive and schooling eﬀects in girls than boys are reviewed
in Anderson (2008) (see also the results in Heckman et al. (2010), or Ramey and Campbell (2007),
regarding education outcomes of these interventions). Similarly, Krueger (1999) also reports that
the STAR class size experiment produce smaller short run impacts, but larger cumulative impacts
for girls than boys, and Chetty et al. (2014) show slightly larger long term impacts of teacher
quality on girls than boys. Although this was not directly an educational intervention (but which
may have partly operated through access to better schools), the Moving to Opportunity exper-
iment studied in Kling et al. (2007) also shows much stronger impacts for girls. In developing
countries, several papers show stronger impacts of interventions on girls than boys (Kremer and
Holla (2009)), although these concern primarily interventions that increase access to school.
At baseline girls score between 10% - 20% of a standard deviation below boys in the cognitive
tests we administer (not shown) and hence start from a lower base. However, this explanation
of larger program impacts is hard to reconcile with the fact that, as we show below, eﬀects are
larger for those with higher baseline ability (and this is especially true for females). An alternative
hypothesis would be that girls bring to elementary schools more discipline, patience, and higher
levels of maturity overall than boys at a given age, which may make them better able to enjoy the
beneﬁts of additional school resources, such as a better teacher, better training manuals, a library,
and so on.
The program also had a large impact for higher-ability students: the index of scores (column
4) increased by 0.14 standard deviations in the ﬁrst follow-up and 0.17 standard deviations in the
second follow-up as a result of the program, though the coeﬃcients are only marginally signiﬁ-
cant. This is consistent with the idea that investments in skills are complementary over time and
hence will be more productive for those with high levels of skill to start with. There are several
education interventions that share this characteristic. However, despite the large changes in the
point estimates across ability groups, the diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant.
We now turn to diﬀerences by North and South of the country, two very diﬀerent regions.
There are dramatic diﬀerences in program impacts depending on whether the school is located in
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the South of the country (which are poorer and have worse school results) or in the North.17 In
fact, if we focus on 3rd grade French scores, there are no statistically signiﬁcant impacts of the
program in the North of the country, whereas in the South they are very large. For example, as a
result of the program, students in southern schools are able to increase the proportion of correct
answers by 10.2 percentage points, which is almost 0.5 of a standard deviation. These eﬀects are
qualitatively similar for other tests and persist through the end of the grade (second follow-up).
When we examine all of the tests and correct the p-values for multiple testing, the impacts remain
signiﬁcant despite the high number of hypotheses tested.
The South-North diﬀerences in estimates of the impact of school grants are striking as well as
highly signiﬁcant overall for the ﬁrst follow up (p-value 2.1% for the index). It may be the case
that the types of investments made in response to the grants varied by region and took diﬀerent
amounts of time to manifest themselves in test scores. In the remainder of the paper we examine
whether there are diﬀerences between what school principals, teachers, and parents did in response
to the availability of school grants in each of these areas, which could help shed light on the sources
of regional diﬀerences in the impacts of the program on the performance of students.
5.4 Understanding Diﬀerences Between South and North
We start by examining baseline test performance diﬀerences of third grade students between
schools in the South and in the North. These are shown in Table 4, Panel A. Students in the
southern schools perform worse on almost all tests than their counterparts in the North. For
control schools in the ﬁrst follow-up, documented in Panel B, the diﬀerences between the North
and the South are even larger.
As mentioned above, at baseline we were only able to survey a subsample of schools. The
missing schools (recovered at follow-up) were, as far as we can see, balanced in their treatment
and control status, but they were diﬀerent from the sampled schools. In fact, as we report in
the appendix (Appendix Table 13), among control schools, missing schools are worse than the
non-missing schools on a number of time-invariant dimensions, as one might expect.
Therefore, it is probably safe to say that, once we look at the schools in the follow-up which
we are using to measure program impacts, the schools in the South show much lower test results
than the schools in the North.
17In Appendix Table 12 we show that the samples are balanced within each geographic region.
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Table 4: Regional Diﬀerences, Second-Third Grade
South North Diﬀerence
Panel A: Test Scores at Beginning of Second Grade (Baseline)
Percent Correct: French 0.430 0.420 0.010 (0.027)
Percent Correct: Math 0.325 0.373 -0.048∗∗ (0.023)
Percent Correct: Oral 0.154 0.242 -0.088∗∗∗ (0.016)
Index Score (standardized) -0.239 0.049 -0.288∗∗ (0.112)
Panel B: Test Scores at Beginning of Third Grade (First Follow-Up, Control Schools)
Percent Correct: French 0.411 0.564 -0.153∗∗∗ (0.022)
Percent Correct: Math 0.434 0.569 -0.136∗∗∗ (0.021)
Percent Correct: Oral 0.233 0.383 -0.150∗∗∗ (0.022)
Index Score (standardized) -0.629 0.100 -0.730∗∗∗ (0.100)
Panel C: Household Characteristics (First Follow-Up, Control Schools)
Household size 8.625 10.216 -1.591∗∗∗ (0.412)
Number of children in household 5.050 5.551 -0.501∗ (0.276)
Head has any education 0.550 0.401 0.149∗∗∗ (0.050)
Percent of adult females with any education 0.261 0.224 0.038 (0.043)
Wealth index -0.654 0.137 -0.792∗∗∗ (0.092)
Interview conducted in French 0.175 0.090 0.085∗∗ (0.041)
Panel D: Project Characteristics (Second Follow-Up, Treatment Schools)
Months since project began 15.914 23.479 -7.564∗∗∗ (1.144)
Students helped draft application 0.800 0.547 0.253∗∗∗ (0.082)
Project included manuals 0.800 0.895 -0.095 (0.074)
Project included computer materials 0.029 0.121 -0.092∗∗ (0.042)
Project included teacher training 0.914 0.752 0.162∗∗ (0.062)
Project included management training 0.629 0.368 0.261∗∗∗ (0.093)
Project included building courses 0.971 0.821 0.151∗∗∗ (0.046)
Project included improving general education 0.563 0.456 0.106 (0.100)
Project included improving educational outputs 0.114 0.129 -0.015 (0.063)
Amount spent on principal (1,000,000s CFA) 0.082 0.034 0.048∗∗∗ (0.014)
Amount spent on teachers (1,000,000s CFA) 0.317 0.278 0.039 (0.058)
Amount spent on management (1,000,000s CFA) 0.128 0.041 0.087∗∗∗ (0.022)
Amount spent on students (1,000,000s CFA) 0.505 1.025 -0.520∗∗∗ (0.092)
Each coeﬃcient reported is the diﬀerence in test score between south and north (south-north). The
mean test scores in the South for French, math, and oral at baseline are 0.400, 0.292, and 0.134
for females and 0.461, 0.358, and 0.173 for males, respectively, and at ﬁrst follow- up are 0.426,
0.430, and 0.215 for females and 0.457, 0.486, and 0.298 for males. Clustered standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Panel C compares household characteristics of students in the South and in the North. Because
of the missing schools at baseline, we take characteristics measured in the ﬁrst follow-up among
students in the control schools. A few interesting patterns emerge. Households in the South
are poorer but have fewer children and better educated heads (and more prominently so for the
families of female students).
Finally, Panel D considers the characteristics of projects being undertaken by schools with the
school grant funds. This information comes from a survey conducted in treatment schools which
asked principals about the project for which they got funding. We conducted two of these surveys,
one at ﬁrst follow-up, and one at second follow-up. We report estimates from the second follow-up
survey when, presumably, data about the project is more mature and complete.
In the South, students were much more frequently named as participants in the drafting of
the proposal. Although it is not clear what input students may have had, this could indicate that
principals were more sensitive to the needs of the students in the South. It is also signiﬁcant
that projects in the South started later. By the end of year 2 of the study projects in the North
had been running 7.6 months longer than in the South. If results faded out quickly this could
explain why we observe eﬀects of the more recent projects than in the earlier projects but this
is unlikely to be the case, given our previous results about the sustainability of program impacts
(although those are not very precise). If, on the other hand, a project needed time before it
started to inﬂuence children's learning (as in the case of activities that take time, such as training
a teacher, or building a library), we would expect larger impacts for more mature projects, which
goes against what we ﬁnd in terms of the South - North comparison.
Some of the most remarkable diﬀerences relate to the components of the project. The schools
in the North were more likely to have components involving the purchase of textbooks/manuals
and in particular computer related materials, while schools in the South were much more likely to
have components related to training of teachers, building courses, managerial training, spending
on the principal and the teachers. At the same time the Northern schools reported more spending
on students. Thus there are clear diﬀerences in the characteristics of projects in schools in the
North and the South, as stated by the principals of these schools. Schools in the South seem to be
investing more in the teaching and management abilities of their human resources, while schools
in the North invest more in equipment. This may well be a force behind the large diﬀerences in
program impacts in these two sets of schools.
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Table 5 reports the impact of the program on principals' (panel A) and teachers' (panel B)
behaviors. We present separate estimates of program impacts in the South and in the North, and
test whether diﬀerences in program impacts in these two areas are equal to zero (column 3).
There are no broad impacts of the school grants on aspects of school infrastructure. This
was expected because, as we mentioned above, the projects had to have an explicit pedagogical
emphasis, which did not (in the government's deﬁnition) include physical infrastructure. However
one aspect that can be considered infrastructure was very signiﬁcantly aﬀected by school grants
both in the North and in the South: the existence of a library in the school. While the impact is
twice as large in the South as in the North, we cannot reject that the two impacts are statistically
equal. In addition, schools in the North that received a school grant spent more money on
electricity and water for the school.
Regarding school materials and training, we see that the school grants caused an increase in
books in the library in the North and an increase in the amount spent on manuals in both regions.
In contrast, schools in the South spent substantially more in tutoring while both sets of schools
increased spending on teacher training. All this is very much consistent with the way principals
described the grant projects, as reported in Table 4. While the point estimates reveal diﬀerences
in direction in the North and South, it is diﬃcult to be conclusive since none of the impacts are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the two (except expenditure on electricity and water).
It is also interesting that there was an increase in the number of students in the North, which
is not matched by an equally large increase in the number of teachers, and which could lead to a
dilution of treatment eﬀects. In the South both these quantities go down, but not signiﬁcantly.
Finally, school grants decreased teacher turnover, particularly in the South. Given that teachers
are likely to be the most important input in the school production function, the fact that in the
South the program signiﬁcantly aﬀected the amount of training they got and how likely they were
to remain in the school from one year to the next, is consistent with the ﬁnding of strong program
impacts on student performance in this region of the country.
Panel B shows program impacts on teacher and classroom characteristics as reported by the
3rd grade teacher in the ﬁrst follow-up. The number of manuals are not reported by the teacher
as having increased signiﬁcantly either in the north or the south, despite the impact on manuals
reported above, and measuring equipment in the South is reported to have increased as a response
to the program, but not in the North.
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Table 5: Program Impacts on School Characteristics by Region, First Follow-Up
South North Diﬀerence
Panel A: School Characteristics
Age of youngest infrastructure 1.135 0.298 0.837
(1.500) (0.928) (1.764)
Number of teachers -0.975 0.823 -1.798
(1.085) (0.564) (1.223)
Number of students -29.100 51.321∗ -80.421
(49.317) (29.009) (57.216)
School has library 0.201∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.081
(0.086) (0.049) (0.099)
Number of books in library 15.343 85.753∗ -70.410
(80.607) (44.284) (91.971)
Amount spent on infrastructure 40.337 53.156 -12.819
(39.718) (40.678) (56.853)
Amount spent on electricity/water -10.421 29.550∗ -39.972∗∗
(7.867) (15.735) (17.592)
Amount spent on manuals 27.388∗∗ 23.019∗∗ 4.369
(11.112) (10.507) (15.293)
Amount spent on tutoring 50.230∗ 13.512∗ 36.718
(29.365) (7.731) (30.366)
Amount spent on teacher training 30.487∗∗ 27.856∗ 2.630
(13.825) (14.315) (19.901)
Teacher composition changed in past year -0.201∗∗ -0.064 -0.138
(0.086) (0.042) (0.096)
Percent teachers female -0.031 0.012 -0.043
(0.040) (0.025) (0.048)
Average teacher age 0.273 0.315 -0.041
(0.772) (0.432) (0.885)
Percent of teachers with Baccalaureate -0.043 -0.008 -0.035
(0.049) (0.025) (0.056)
Average teacher experience 0.224 0.098 0.126
(0.583) (0.396) (0.705)
Panel B: Third Grade Teacher Characteristics
Minutes spent preparing lesson 3.226 1.894 1.332
(2.941) (2.061) (3.591)
Number of manuals 10.475 4.990 5.486
(7.647) (4.980) (9.125)
Number of measuring instruments 0.805∗∗ -0.039 0.844∗∗
(0.338) (0.208) (0.397)
Times per day ask for silence -5.060∗∗∗ -0.774 -4.287∗∗
(1.847) (0.699) (1.975)
Times per day punish a student 0.263 -0.242 0.505
(0.792) (0.268) (0.837)
Column 3 reports the diﬀerence between the impact of the program in the south
and the north. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Amounts in CFA.
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Finally, the behavior of students is reported to have improved considerably in the South, but
not in the North: treatment aﬀected how often teachers had to ask for silence during the day in
southern schools. This corresponds to what we found before when we compared the reports of 3rd
and 5th grade teacher (see Appendix Table 9). Student behavior improved among 3rd graders but
not among 5th graders, which is exactly what happened in terms of test results. The improved
behavior, may be an outcome driven by improved teaching more generally, which underlies the
improved scores.
We also examined the impact of the program on household behaviors in the South and in the
North, which is shown in Appendix Table 13. However, there are no noteworthy impacts of the
program on household behaviors, and they do not seem to vary with the region of the country
where households are located.
The resulting picture from this section is mixed. There are several diﬀerences between the
South and the North: households are poorer yet more educated in the south, and projects in
the south tended to focus on training and human resources and less on information technology.
However, when we look at the impact of the grant on how schools use the money, there are no
obviously signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the north and south. Nevertheless, the improvement in
behavior in the south is remarkable and one can expect that fewer classroom disruptions - perhaps
due to teacher training - can help learning.
6 Conclusions
There is substantial debate about the importance of resources in schools for student performance.
More often than not, increases in school resources are not associated with increases in student
performance, although much of the research concerns developed countries and the US in particular.
One reason may be that central education authorities lack an understanding of the needs of schools.
Principals, on the other hand, could have better information and could target resources more
eﬃciently. The danger is that incentives to improve student performance may vary across school
principals and there may be several sources of local pressures for alternative uses of these funds.
This paper studies the impact of a school grant program on student performance and on
potential mechanisms that could underlie the change in school performance induced by such a
program. We ﬁnd impacts of school grants on student learning, especially on girls with high ability
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levels at baseline. Notably, these impacts persist over the two years of our evaluation. However,
these impacts occur only in third grade, as opposed to later grades, and they are stronger in the
South of the country. These results suggest that resources distributed in a decentralized manner
can have positive impacts on students.
While it is diﬃcult to explain the grade diﬀerential in program impacts, one conjecture is that
principals focus on earlier grades because they see there the foundations for future learning and
indeed they are encouraged to do so. We can say a bit more, however, about the North-South
diﬀerence in program impacts, based on how we see principals spending their resources. While
schools in the North emphasized information technology (IT) and other educational materials,
schools in the South emphasized human resources, namely through the training of teachers and
school administrators. Our results suggest that the latter type of investments, although perhaps
less visible to the local community (and therefore less preferred by say, local politicians, or even
local school authorities), is likely to be more eﬀective than the former type of investments. This
result is also consistent with the idea that the main determinant of school quality is teachers, not
equipment, as suggested by the most recent literature on this topic (e.g., Hanushek and Rivkin
(2006)).
26
References
Anderson, M. L. (2008). Multiple inference and gender diﬀerences in the eﬀects of early interven-
tion: A reevaluation of the abecedarian, perry preschool, and early training projects. Journal
of the American statistical Association, 103(484). 5.3
ANSD (2007). La pauvrete au senegal: de la devaluation de 1994 a 2001-2002. Technical report,
Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Demographie. 5.3
Banerjee, A. V., Cole, S., Duﬂo, E., and Linden, L. (2007). Remedying education: Evidence from
two randomized experiments in india. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3):12351264.
1
Blimpo, M., Evans, D., and Lahire, N. (2014). School-based management and educational out-
comes, lessons from a randomized ﬁeld experiment. 1
Bruns, B., Filmer, D., and Patrinos, H. A. (2011). Making schools work: New evidence on ac-
countability reforms. World Bank Publications. 5.1
Chetty, R., Friedman, J. N., and Rockoﬀ, J. E. (2014). Measuring the impacts of teachers ii:
Teacher value-added and student outcomes in adulthood. The American Economic Review,
104(9):26332679. 5.3
Galiani, S., Gertler, P., and Schargrodsky, E. (2008). School decentralization: Helping the good
get better, but leaving the poor behind. Journal of Public Economics, 92(10):21062120. 1
Galiani, S. and Perez-Truglia, R. (2013). School management in developing countries. Education
Policy in Developing Countries, 4:193. 1
Glewwe, P., Hanushek, E. A., Humpage, S., and Ravina, R. (2013). School resources and educa-
tional outcomes in developing countries: A review of the literature from 1990 to 2010. Education
Policy in Developing Countries, 4:13. 1
Glewwe, P. and Kremer, M. (2006). Schools, teachers, and education outcomes in developing
countries. Handbook of the Economics of Education, 2:9451017. 1
Glewwe, P., Kremer, M., and Moulin, S. (2009). Many children left behind? textbooks and test
scores in kenya. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(1):112135. 1
Glewwe, P., Kremer, M., Moulin, S., and Zitzewitz, E. (2004). Retrospective vs. prospective
analyses of school inputs: the case of ﬂip charts in kenya. Journal of Development Economics,
74(1):251268. 1
Hanushek, E. A. (2006). School resources. Handbook of the Economics of Education, 2:865908.
5.1
Hanushek, E. A., Link, S., and Woessmann, L. (2013). Does school autonomy make sense every-
where? panel estimates from pisa. Journal of Development Economics, 104:212232. 1
Hanushek, E. A. and Rivkin, S. G. (2006). Teacher quality. Handbook of the Economics of
Education, 2:10511078. 6
27
Hanushek, E. A. and Woessmann, L. (2010). The economics of international diﬀerences in educa-
tional achievement. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research. 1
Heckman, J., Moon, S., Pinto, R., Savelyev, P., and Yavitz, A. (2010). Analyzing social exper-
iments as implemented: A reexamination of the evidence from the highscope perry preschool
program. Quantitative economics, 1(1):146. 5.3
Kling, J. R., Liebman, J. B., and Katz, L. F. (2007). Experimental analysis of neighborhood
eﬀects. Econometrica, 75(1):83119. 5.3
Kremer, M. and Holla, A. (2009). Improving education in the developing world: what have we
learned from randomized evaluations? Annual Review of Economics, 1:513. 5.3
Krueger, A. B. (1999). Experimental estimates of education production functions. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, pages 497532. 5.3
Murnane, R. J. and Ganimian, A. J. (2014). Improving educational outcomes in developing
countries: Lessons from rigorous evaluations. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic
Research. 1
PASEC (2007). Evaluation pasec senegal. Technical report, Program on the Analysis of Education
Systems. 1
Ramey, C. T. and Campbell, F. A. (2007). Carolina abecedarian project. Technical report,
http://phoenixday.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/res-Abecedarian-studies-full.pdf. 5.3
Reinikka, R. and Svensson, J. (2004). Local capture: evidence from a central government transfer
program in uganda. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2):679705. 5.1
Romano, J. P. and Wolf, M. (2005). Stepwise multiple testing as formalized data snooping.
Econometrica, 73(4):12371282. 1
World Bank (2013). Projet d'amelioration de la qualite et de l'equite de l'education de base.
Technical report. 1
28
Online Appendix: Not for Publication
Figure 4: Location of Schools in Sample
Note: The allocation of schools to cohorts is the result of the randomization of the sequence with which grants
were allocated. Cohort 1 were the ﬁrst to receive grants, followed by cohort 2 and then cohort 3.
A. Test Score Distributions
In this appendix we document the way the distribution of test scores changed over time and as
a result of the experiment. Figure 5 shows the densities of scores in the French, mathematics,
and oral tests taken at the beginning of 2nd grade at baseline, the beginning of 3rd grade at ﬁrst
follow-up, and the end of 3rd grade at second follow-up. The dashed lines in the ﬁgures correspond
to the control schools while the solid lines are the treatment schools.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Second/Third Grade Scores
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As expected given earlier results, the thinnest, lightest lines show that the distributions of
test scores are balanced for treatment and control at baseline (beginning of second grade). The
lines with a medium level of thickness correspond to the densities of scores at the beginning of
third grade at ﬁrst follow-up. Although the densities of test scores are balanced at baseline,
they are diﬀerent at ﬁrst follow-up, indicating that the program has an impact on this group of
children. Notice also that students in the ﬁrst follow-up have a much higher (and statistically
signiﬁcant) proportion of correct answers than at baseline (recall that they take the same test
in both occasions). Given that the baseline takes place at the beginning of second grade, and
the ﬁrst follow-up at the beginning of third grade, this is expected if schools provide knowledge
about the test material. The thickest lines in Figure 5 correspond to the densities of scores for the
second follow-up, conducted at the end of third grade. We use the same test as in the previous
two waves. Like before, the evolution of test scores shows (statistically signiﬁcant) learning during
third grade. Program impacts remain strong towards the end of the third grade, roughly two years
after the funds were disbursed to the treatment schools.
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Figure 6: Distribution of Fourth/Fifth Grade Scores
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Analogously, in Figure 6, we display the densities of scores at ﬁrst and second follow-up for
students who were in fourth grade at baseline (and in ﬁfth grade in the subsequent year). The
diﬀerences between treatment and control schools are smaller than the ones we document for grade
3. In the main body of the paper we show that there is no statistically signiﬁcant impact of school
grants on ﬁfth grade test scores.
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B. Other Appendix Tables and Figures
Figure 7: Distributional Impacts on Test Scores in Fifth Grade
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Notes: Point estimates from a quantile regression at each decile with 95% conﬁdence intervals. Index and PPVT
coeﬃcients are standardized.
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Table 6: First Follow-up Descriptive Statistics and Balance
Grade 2 Grade 4
Control Treat-Control Control Treat-Control
Panel A: Household Characteristics
Household size 9.92 (4.41) 0.16 (0.34) 10.04 (4.31) -0.46 (0.31)
Number of children in household 5.46 (2.80) 0.24 (0.21) 5.69 (2.79) -0.32 (0.21)
Head has any education 0.43 (0.50) -0.00 (0.04) 0.44 (0.50) -0.03 (0.04)
Percent adult females with any education 0.23 (0.34) 0.00 (0.03) 0.24 (0.36) 0.02 (0.03)
Distance to school (km) 0.61 (0.63) -0.09∗∗ (0.04) 0.59 (0.60) 0.01 (0.04)
Home has electricity 0.44 (0.50) 0.05 (0.04) 0.44 (0.50) 0.02 (0.04)
Home has modern toilet 0.37 (0.48) -0.02 (0.04) 0.35 (0.48) -0.03 (0.04)
Land owned (hectares) 2.59 (4.63) 0.53 (0.48) 2.33 (3.49) 0.09 (0.29)
Interview conducted in French 0.11 (0.31) 0.01 (0.02) 0.09 (0.29) -0.00 (0.02)
Panel B: School Characteristics
Distance to nearest city (km) 18.35 (24.78) 0.10 (2.10) 17.41 (22.61) 0.91 (2.07)
Population in locality (100,000s) 0.92 (2.74) 0.27 (0.31) 0.93 (2.75) 0.30 (0.32)
Locality has health center 0.71 (0.45) 0.03 (0.04) 0.71 (0.45) 0.03 (0.04)
School located in South 0.19 (0.40) 0.00 (0.04) 0.20 (0.40) -0.00 (0.04)
Notes: Grouped columns 2 and 4 report means and standard deviations of baseline characteristics in control
schools for grades 2 and 4, respectively. Grouped columns 3 and 5 report diﬀerences in characteristis between
treatment and control schools at baseline and their standard errors, clustered by school. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 7: Summary Statistics of Nationally Representative Sample of 2nd and 5th Grade Students
Mean Standard Deviation
Panel A: School and Teacher Characteristics
Locality has health center 0.809 (0.393)
School has electricity 0.359 (0.480)
Number of teachers 9.809 (5.007)
Number of students 500.683 (386.209)
School has library 0.217 (0.412)
Percent of teachers with Baccalaureate 0.474 (0.499)
Panel B: Household Characteristics
Father literate 0.585 (0.493)
Mother literate 0.355 (0.478)
House has electricity 0.595 (0.491)
House has TV 0.598 (0.490)
House has modern toilet 0.367 (0.482)
Notes: Weighted means and standard deviations (in parentheses) shown. Source:
PASEC 2006.
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Table 8: Program Impacts on Grades 3 and 5 Test Scores, No Controls
French Math Oral Index PPVT
Panel A: Beginning of Grade (First Follow-Up)
Overall 0.021 0.018 0.017 0.078
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.068)
Observations 5368 5361 2732 2679
Control Mean (SD) 0.51 (0.23) 0.49 (0.23) 0.50 (0.27)
Grade 3 0.029∗ 0.026 0.032∗ 0.138∗
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.081)
Observations 2720 2718 1385 1350
Control Mean (SD) 0.53 (0.25) 0.54 (0.24) 0.35 (0.22)
Grade 5 0.011 0.009 0.004 0.016
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.081)
Observations 2648 2643 1347 1329
Control Mean (SD) 0.48 (0.20) 0.44 (0.20) 0.64 (0.24)
Panel B: End of Grade (Second Follow-Up)
Overall 0.019 0.003 0.026 0.091 0.046
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.077) (0.085)
Observations 3338 3327 1686 1620 1122
Control Mean (SD) 0.63 (0.22) 0.62 (0.22) 0.58 (0.26)
Grade 3 0.033∗ 0.014 0.045∗∗ 0.176∗ 0.170∗
(0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.096) (0.098)
Observations 1732 1721 853 826 566
Control Mean (SD) 0.66 (0.23) 0.68 (0.23) 0.45 (0.23)
Grade 5 0.002 -0.011 0.007 0.002 -0.082
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.093) (0.097)
Observations 1606 1606 833 794 556
Control Mean (SD) 0.59 (0.20) 0.57 (0.20) 0.72 (0.21)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 correspond to p-values from the usual single-hypothesis tests.
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Table 9: Program Impacts on Teacher and Household Outcomes, First Follow-Up
Grade 3 Grade 5 Diﬀerence
Panel A: Teacher Outcomes
Teacher has Baccalaureate -0.052 0.018 -0.070
(0.047) (0.046) (0.064)
Teacher had training in past 5 years 0.083∗∗ 0.101∗∗ -0.018
(0.039) (0.047) (0.056)
Minutes spent preparing lesson 2.115 0.061 2.054
(1.726) (1.614) (2.023)
Number of manuals 6.209 6.493 -0.284
(4.231) (4.964) (5.296)
Number of measuring instruments 0.138 0.228 -0.090
(0.179) (0.193) (0.210)
Number of chairs 0.018 0.071∗∗ -0.053
(0.038) (0.035) (0.041)
Teaches with books 0.004 0.012 -0.008
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015)
Teaches with computers -0.005 0.034 -0.038
(0.019) (0.024) (0.029)
Times per day ask for silence -1.638∗∗ 1.109 -2.747∗∗∗
(0.686) (0.830) (0.931)
Times per day punish a student -0.126 0.741∗∗ -0.868∗∗
(0.277) (0.370) (0.407)
Number of students who left in past year 0.303 1.063 -0.760
(0.730) (0.800) (1.095)
Number of students who joined in past year 0.262 -0.030 0.292
(0.212) (0.185) (0.194)
Panel B: Household Outcomes
Days of school missed last week 0.106 0.010 0.096
(0.075) (0.055) (0.086)
Student works after school -0.008 -0.016 0.008
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Parent involved in school 0.037 0.026 0.011
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
Expenditure on uniform (1,000s CFA) -0.003 -0.070 0.067
(0.070) (0.056) (0.055)
Expenditure on tuition (1,000s CFA) 0.303 0.035 0.269
(0.303) (0.164) (0.313)
Expenditure on supplies (1,000s CFA) -0.162 -0.111 -0.050
(0.232) (0.320) (0.302)
Student has tutor -0.027 -0.009 -0.017
(0.026) (0.029) (0.031)
Expenditure on children (1,000s CFA) 0.303 -0.175 0.477
(0.611) (0.662) (0.683)
Column 3 reports the diﬀerence in impacts between grade 3 and grade 5. Clustered
standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Characteristics of Schools by Baseline Missing Status, First Follow-Up
Not Missing Missing Diﬀerence
Panel A: Treatment Status
Treated 0.337 0.312 0.025
(0.473) (0.464) (0.089)
Panel B: Control School Characteristics
School located in South 0.186 0.439 -0.253∗∗
(0.389) (0.497) (0.116)
School located in Rural Area 0.736 1.000 -0.264∗∗∗
(0.441) (0.000) (0.025)
Locality Population (100,000s) 0.981 0.024 0.957∗∗∗
(2.827) (0.026) (0.173)
Number of Teachers 9.946 7.090 2.856∗∗∗
(4.954) (4.144) (0.991)
Number of Pupils 341.617 238.326 103.291∗∗∗
(254.680) (152.758) (37.826)
Percent Correct: French, Grade 3 0.540 0.418 0.123∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.239) (0.045)
Percent Correct: Math, Grade 3 0.550 0.408 0.142∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.228) (0.042)
Percent Correct: Oral, Grade 3 0.361 0.212 0.149∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.178) (0.037)
Percent Correct: Index, Grade 3 -0.012 -0.666 0.653∗∗∗
(1.009) (0.939) (0.203)
Percent Correct: French, Grade 5 0.483 0.379 0.104∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.190) (0.032)
Percent Correct: Math, Grade 5 0.441 0.342 0.099∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.195) (0.037)
Percent Correct: Oral, Grade 5 0.648 0.572 0.076
(0.236) (0.257) (0.050)
Percent Correct: Index, Grade 5 0.026 -0.483 0.509∗∗∗
(0.943) (0.937) (0.179)
Columns 1 and 2 report means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for schools
that were not missing at baseline and missing at baseline, respectively. Column 3
reports the diﬀerence in means between not missing and missing schools, and clustered
standard errors (at the school level) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Program Impacts on Grades 5 Test Scores by Gender, Ability, and Region
French Math Oral Index PPVT
Panel A: Beginning of Grade (First Follow-Up)
Male 0.014 0.008 0.020 0.043
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.064)
Female 0.009 0.013 -0.005 0.009
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.061)
Male Control Mean (SD) 0.49 (0.20) 0.46 (0.21) 0.66 (0.24) 0.07 (1.02)
Female Control Mean (SD) 0.46 (0.20) 0.41 (0.20) 0.63 (0.23) -0.09 (0.96)
Low Ability 0.009 -0.009 0.003 -0.016
(0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.066)
High Ability 0.000 0.013 0.017 0.039
(0.016) (0.018) (0.013) (0.071)
Low Control Mean (SD) 0.35 (0.14) 0.33 (0.15) 0.51 (0.22) -0.63 (0.76)
High Control Mean (SD) 0.62 (0.16) 0.56 (0.18) 0.79 (0.13) 0.72 (0.66)
North 0.017 0.014 -0.002 0.029
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.057)
South -0.021 -0.010 0.049 0.009
(0.026) (0.030) (0.032) (0.130)
North Control Mean (SD) 0.50 (0.20) 0.46 (0.20) 0.68 (0.22) 0.13 (0.96)
South Control Mean (SD) 0.37 (0.17) 0.33 (0.18) 0.52 (0.25) -0.55 (0.94)
Panel B: End of Grade (Second Follow-Up)
Male -0.001 -0.013 0.019 0.046 -0.029
(0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.081) (0.123)
Female 0.008 -0.003 -0.006 -0.022 -0.095
(0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.072) (0.127)
Male Control Mean (SD) 0.60 (0.20) 0.59 (0.20) 0.73 (0.20) 0.06 (0.99) 0.05 (1.02)
Female Control Mean (SD) 0.59 (0.19) 0.54 (0.21) 0.71 (0.21) -0.06 (0.95) 0.03 (1.01)
Low Ability -0.002 -0.020 -0.032 -0.120
(0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.087)
High Ability 0.006 -0.007 0.012 0.016
(0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.079)
Low Control Mean (SD) 0.49 (0.17) 0.46 (0.18) 0.63 (0.21) -0.53 (0.86)
High Control Mean (SD) 0.71 (0.15) 0.68 (0.17) 0.83 (0.12) 0.62 (0.65)
North 0.003 -0.009 0.004 0.004 -0.014
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.067) (0.099)
South -0.002 -0.010 0.020 0.046 -0.181
(0.026) (0.028) (0.036) (0.144) (0.259)
North Control Mean (SD) 0.62 (0.19) 0.60 (0.19) 0.74 (0.19) 0.11 (0.92) -0.06 (0.94)
South Control Mean (SD) 0.49 (0.20) 0.45 (0.20) 0.65 (0.24) -0.47 (1.04) 0.44 (1.18)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 correspond
to p-values from the usual single-hypothesis tests. † corresponds signiﬁcance at the 10% level of Romano Wolf (2005)
p-values from joint tests of French, mathematics, and oral (3 tests each, by row) or to the index alone. Conditioning
variables: Grade, gender, household size, number of children, education of head, distance to school, wealth index, interview
language, baseline scores, missing dummies.
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Table 12: Baseline Descriptive Statistics and Balance (Grade 2), by Region
North South
Control Treat-Control Control Treat-Control
Panel A: Test Scores
Percent Correct: French 0.42 (0.21) 0.01 (0.02) 0.46 (0.26) -0.08 (0.05)
Percent Correct: Math 0.37 (0.23) 0.00 (0.02) 0.33 (0.23) -0.02 (0.05)
Percent Correct: Oral 0.24 (0.17) 0.01 (0.02) 0.14 (0.14) 0.03 (0.03)
Index Score (standardized) 0.04 (0.98) 0.04 (0.09) -0.17 (0.96) -0.19 (0.23)
Panel B: Household Characteristics
Days of school missed last week 0.18 (0.91) 0.06 (0.08) 0.10 (0.55) 0.10 (0.13)
Student works after school 0.01 (0.11) -0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.04 (0.02)
Household size 9.14 (4.03) 0.11 (0.36) 9.79 (4.14) -0.49 (0.69)
Number of children in household 5.13 (2.56) 0.06 (0.23) 5.80 (2.76) -0.46 (0.47)
Head has any education 0.58 (0.49) 0.00 (0.04) 0.68 (0.47) -0.10 (0.09)
Percent of adult females with any education 0.37 (0.41) -0.03 (0.03) 0.35 (0.39) -0.01 (0.07)
Distance to school (km) 0.68 (0.86) -0.00 (0.07) 0.88 (1.06) -0.38∗∗∗ (0.12)
Parent involved in school 0.41 (0.49) 0.07 (0.04) 0.25 (0.43) 0.17∗ (0.08)
Expenditure on household food (1,000s CFA) 23.56 (16.04) 1.19 (1.29) 14.13 (9.22) 1.25 (1.87)
Expenditure on uniform (1,000s CFA) 2.26 (1.10) 0.10 (0.41) 3.75 (1.04) -0.72 (0.70)
Expenditure on tuition (1,000s CFA) 1.08 (1.17) -0.00 (0.10) 1.19 (1.22) -0.01 (0.23)
Expenditure on supplies (1,000s CFA) 4.10 (6.14) -0.46 (0.34) 2.71 (1.95) -0.05 (0.35)
Student has tutor 0.18 (0.38) -0.01 (0.03) 0.04 (0.18) 0.00 (0.03)
Home has electricity 0.52 (0.50) 0.02 (0.05) 0.25 (0.43) 0.08 (0.09)
Home has modern toilet 0.60 (0.49) -0.01 (0.04) 0.29 (0.46) -0.04 (0.08)
Land owned (hectares) 2.42 (3.53) 0.27 (0.52) 2.15 (3.18) 1.15 (0.99)
Interview conducted in French 0.10 (0.30) -0.03 (0.02) 0.22 (0.42) -0.08 (0.06)
Panel C: School and Teacher Characteristics
Distance to nearest city (km) 18.83 (26.53) 0.08 (2.56) 16.38 (16.54) -0.87 (3.10)
Locality population (100,000s) 1.67 (4.83) 0.04 (0.56) 0.14 (0.37) -0.04 (0.07)
Locality has health center 0.70 (0.46) 0.03 (0.05) 0.74 (0.44) -0.01 (0.10)
School has Electricity 0.58 (0.49) 0.02 (0.05) 0.50 (0.50) -0.01 (0.11)
Number of Teachers 9.53 (4.88) 0.61 (0.56) 10.35 (5.29) -0.30 (1.23)
Number of Pupils 335.33 (252.92) 36.62 (28.67) 366.65 (248.77) -8.09 (56.47)
School has library 0.24 (0.43) 0.07 (0.05) 0.07 (0.25) 0.10 (0.08)
Number of computers 1.44 (4.48) -0.03 (0.46) 0.58 (3.87) 0.06 (0.66)
Number of manuals in classroom 61.41 (45.68) 5.07 (5.15) 53.02 (42.26) -5.60 (9.26)
Percent teachers female 0.33 (0.23) 0.01 (0.03) 0.24 (0.22) -0.01 (0.04)
Average teacher age 33.16 (4.45) -0.16 (0.44) 32.93 (3.18) -0.00 (0.77)
Percent teachers with Baccalaureate 0.41 (0.23) -0.01 (0.03) 0.42 (0.21) -0.05 (0.05)
Average teacher experience 6.57 (3.90) 0.17 (0.41) 6.49 (2.57) -0.34 (0.57)
Percent teachers with training in past 5 years 0.50 (0.50) 0.10∗ (0.05) 0.37 (0.48) 0.09 (0.12)
Percent of principals with Baccalaureate 0.74 (0.44) -0.02 (0.05) 0.73 (0.44) -0.19∗ (0.11)
Notes: Grouped columns 2 and 4 report means and standard deviations of baseline characteristics in control schools for grades 2 and
4, respectively. Grouped columns 3 and 5 report diﬀerences in characteristis between treatment and control schools at baseline and
their standard errors, clustered by school. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 13: Program Impacts on Grade 3 Household Characteristics by Region, First Follow-Up
South North Diﬀerence
Student works after school 0.015 -0.013 0.017
(0.025) (0.014) (0.025)
Days of school missed last week 0.345∗∗ 0.049 0.391
(0.173) (0.082) (0.291)
Parent involved in school -0.039 0.057 -0.017
(0.073) (0.043) (0.117)
Expenditure on uniform (1,000s CFA) 0.008 -0.010 -0.015
(0.257) (0.059) (0.254)
Expenditure on tuition (1,000s CFA) 1.321 0.056 1.230
(1.431) (0.117) (1.427)
Expenditure on supplies (1,000s CFA) -0.129 -0.155 -0.015
(0.476) (0.261) (0.640)
Student has tutor -0.018 -0.027 0.014
(0.029) (0.031) (0.048)
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report program impacts in the South and North, and
Column 3 reports the diﬀerence in program impacts between South and North.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 14: Student Test Score Sample Sizes and Attrition
Grade 3 Grade 5
French Math Oral French Math Oral
Baseline Sample Size 2722 2752 1388 2724 2726 1362
First Followup Sample Size 2720 2718 1385 2648 2643 1347
New Observations 322 299 177 262 261 155
Total Attrition 324 333 180 338 344 170
% Attrition 0.119 0.121 0.130 0.124 0.126 0.125
% Attrition, Treated 0.118 0.117 0.113 0.116 0.116 0.114
% Attrition, Control 0.119 0.123 0.138 0.128 0.131 0.130
Second Followup Sample Size 1732 1721 853 1606 1606 833
Total Attrition* 290 301 208 355 357 186
% Attrition* 0.157 0.162 0.222 0.197 0.197 0.206
% Attrition*, Treated 0.160 0.165 0.230 0.204 0.206 0.224
% Attrition*, Control 0.155 0.159 0.215 0.189 0.189 0.188
Observed in All Waves 1464 1461 709 1396 1392 696
Notes: Attrition in the second follow-up is based on cohorts 1 and 3, since cohort 2 schools
were dropped in the second follow-up. A student in the second follow-up has attrited if
they have a baseline test score but not a second follow-up test score (regardless of their
status in the ﬁrst follow-up).
Notes: Attrition in the second follow-up is based on cohorts 1 and 3, since cohort 2 schools were
dropped in the second follow-up. A student in the second follow-up has attrited if they have a baseline
test score but not a second follow-up test score (regardless of their status in the ﬁrst follow-up).
40
Table 15: Diﬀerence in Baseline Characteristics among Non-Attriters
Grade 2 Grade 4
1st Followup 2nd Followup 1st Followup 2nd Followup
Panel A: Test Scores
Percent Correct: French -0.005 (0.018) 0.006 (0.022) 0.000 (0.014) 0.001 (0.016)
Percent Correct: Math -0.005 (0.018) -0.000 (0.021) -0.003 (0.016) -0.004 (0.018)
Percent Correct: Oral 0.012 (0.015) 0.009 (0.018) -0.007 (0.019) -0.006 (0.023)
Index Score (standardized) -0.020 (0.095) 0.052 (0.114) -0.046 (0.083) -0.029 (0.098)
Panel B: Household Characteristics
Distance to nearest city (km) 0.347 (2.203) -0.513 (2.436) 0.035 (2.341) -0.985 (2.579)
Locality population (100,000s) -0.063 (0.407) 0.160 (0.442) 0.142 (0.473) 0.295 (0.500)
Locality has health center 0.032 (0.044) 0.076 (0.052) 0.032 (0.043) 0.069 (0.052)
School located in South -0.016 (0.038) -0.024 (0.046) -0.021 (0.037) -0.040 (0.044)
School has Electricity 0.021 (0.049) -0.019 (0.056) 0.037 (0.049) 0.003 (0.057)
Number of Teachers 0.464 (0.515) 0.636 (0.587) 0.534 (0.515) 0.708 (0.609)
Number of Pupils 33.657 (25.444) 43.355 (28.603) 31.181 (26.044) 47.491 (30.330)
School has library 0.085∗∗ (0.043) 0.087∗ (0.047) 0.094∗∗ (0.044) 0.079 (0.049)
Number of computers -0.000 (0.397) -0.144 (0.485) 0.052 (0.409) -0.170 (0.515)
Number of manuals in classroom 3.810 (4.564) 3.572 (5.758) 6.530 (5.498) 10.830∗ (6.374)
Percent teachers female 0.007 (0.023) 0.028 (0.026) 0.012 (0.023) 0.032 (0.026)
Average teacher age -0.126 (0.394) -0.056 (0.459) 0.051 (0.392) 0.020 (0.454)
Percent teachers with Baccalaureate -0.012 (0.023) -0.016 (0.027) -0.017 (0.023) -0.017 (0.027)
Average teacher experience 0.085 (0.345) 0.138 (0.394) 0.220 (0.355) 0.168 (0.404)
Percent teachers with training in past 5 years 0.092∗ (0.050) 0.071 (0.058) 0.012 (0.050) 0.024 (0.058)
Percent principals with Baccalaureate -0.034 (0.045) -0.022 (0.052) -0.037 (0.045) -0.026 (0.053)
Panel C: School and Teacher Characteristics
Days of school missed last week 0.084 (0.077) 0.068 (0.109) -0.078∗ (0.042) -0.139∗∗ (0.058)
Student works after school 0.009 (0.009) 0.009 (0.011) -0.015∗ (0.008) -0.025∗ (0.013)
Household size -0.126 (0.335) 0.498 (0.373) 0.217 (0.356) 0.111 (0.430)
Number of children in household -0.098 (0.214) 0.125 (0.242) 0.249 (0.239) 0.159 (0.289)
Head has any education -0.030 (0.039) -0.023 (0.047) -0.077∗ (0.040) -0.067 (0.048)
Percent of adult females with any education -0.016 (0.034) -0.010 (0.040) -0.010 (0.030) 0.002 (0.036)
Distance to school (km) -0.093 (0.064) -0.125 (0.076) -0.020 (0.134) -0.143 (0.239)
Parent involved in school 0.070∗ (0.040) 0.081∗ (0.048) -0.069∗ (0.040) -0.066 (0.049)
Expenditure on household food (1,000s CFA) 0.948 (1.236) 2.343 (1.449) 1.216 (1.286) 0.372 (1.575)
Expenditure on uniform (1,000s CFA) 0.226 (0.437) 0.033 (0.593) -0.124 (0.336) -0.234 (0.410)
Expenditure on tuition (1,000s CFA) 0.029 (0.095) -0.028 (0.119) 0.019 (0.086) -0.071 (0.121)
Expenditure on supplies (1,000s CFA) -0.509 (0.314) -0.529 (0.512) -0.362 (0.287) -0.480 (0.396)
Student has tutor -0.022 (0.028) -0.005 (0.030) 0.006 (0.030) -0.004 (0.034)
Home has electricity 0.043 (0.045) 0.041 (0.053) 0.052 (0.045) 0.048 (0.055)
Home has modern toilet -0.007 (0.042) -0.015 (0.050) 0.016 (0.045) 0.004 (0.053)
Land owned (hectares) 0.293 (0.504) 0.730 (0.561) -0.214 (0.322) -0.155 (0.395)
Interview conducted in French -0.041∗ (0.023) -0.036 (0.029) -0.014 (0.025) 0.001 (0.029)
Notes: Columns 2 and 4 report the diﬀerence in means between treatment and control. Standard deviations in parentheses in columns
1 and 3. Clustered standard errors in parentheses in columns 2 and 4. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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